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Note
The Electronic Communications Privacy Act of
1986 and Satellite Descramblers: Toward
Preventing Statutory Obsolescence
Samuel Rosenstein
"[Tihe satellite-television revolution ... has the potential
to transform the world."' Indeed, satellite antennas can receive
more information 2 than coaxial cable wires3 and can service the
television needs of millions of Americans who will never have
access to cable television.4 Unfortunately for programmers and
others who stand to profit from satellite broadcasts, viewers
throughout America can enjoy this vast array of satellite-car-
ried programming without paying anything. Hundreds of
thousands5 of home earth station6 owners have purchased un-
authorized satellite descramblers, devices that enable them to
receive programming without paying the requisite subscription
fees. 7 The use of unauthorized descramblers now deprives sat-
1. David Owen, Satellite Television, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, June 1985, at
46.
2. Dawn Stover, The Satellite TV Puzzle: Legal Issues Over Scrambling
Telecommunications, POPULAR Sci., Nov. 1986, at 96. However, technology
still being developed---video compression"-will increase the number of cable
channels by at least four times. Tim W. Ferguson, Programming for Profes-
sors, if Cable Survives the Midterm, WALL ST. J., Feb. 11, 1992, at A17.
3. Because phone wires are incapable of fully transmitting television sig-
nals, cable television systems use coaxial cable wire to carry the signals they
receive via satellite directly to the homes of paying subscribers. LYNNE S.
GRoss, THE NEw TELEVISION TECHNOLOGIES 19 (2d ed. 1986).
4. An estimated 30 million Americans will never be able to receive cable
television. Stover, supra note 2, at 96.
5. Estimates vary, but in 1988 Congress suggested that there were about
330,000 descrambler units "compromised by black market decoding chips."
H.R. REP. No. 887(H), 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 28-29 (1988), reprinted in 1988
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5638, 5657-58. As of 1991, this number had increased more than
one and one-half times. See Imposing Syndicated Exclusivity Requirements
on Satellite Delivery of Television Broadcast Signals to Home Earth Station
Receivers, 6 F.C.C.R. 725, 727 (1991) (asserting that about "500,000 units have
been modified to receive encrypted signals without authorization").
6. See infra note 41 and accompanying text.
7. See infra note 59 and accompanying text.
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ellite programmers of millions of dollars in revenue each year.8
Despite this popularity, the manufacture and sale of unau-
thorized satellite descramblers is illegal. Under section 705 of
the Communications Act of 19349-- as amended by the Cable
Communications Policy Act of 1984 (CCPA) and the Satellite
Home Viewer Act of 1988 (SHVA)-sellers of pirated descram-
blers face heavy fines and substantial prison sentences.10 These
statutory provisions, along with the Electronic Communications
and Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA),11 reflect Congress's effort, in
the face of rapidly evolving technology, to modernize laws ad-
dressing the security of communications. 2
This formidable array of statutory weapons indicates that
Congress intended to outlaw pirated descramblers. It is un-
clear, however, whether the Communications Act is the only
statute banning such devices. Federal circuit courts are divided
8. In 1990, the home earth station industry reported that unauthorized
descramblers were costing it $100 million dollars a year. FBI- Turn in Illegal
Satellite Decoders, CHi. TRB., Dec. 25, 1990, at 3; see also ON/TV of Chicago v.
Julien, 763 F.2d 839, 843 (7th Cir. 1985) (asserting that "[s]ales of devices solely
designed to intercept protected communications threaten the viability of the
subscription television industry"); H.R. REP. No. 887(11), supra note 5, at 14,
reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5642 ("[P]iracy has become an increasingly
distressing problem to the satellite industry and seriously threatens to under-
mine the industry's survival."); Scrambling of Satellite Television Signals and
Access to those Signals by Owners of Home Satellite Dish Antennas, 3 F.C.C.R.
1202, 1205 (1988) [hereinafter Scrambling of Signals] ("Unchecked piracy
could ... halt satellite-to-home program distribution.").
9. Pub. L. No. 73-416, § 605, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (current version at 47
U.S.C. § 705 (1988)). The Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984 (CCPA)
redesignated § 605 of the Communications Act of 1934 as § 705, but the
amended section remained codified at § 605. See Michael E. Di Geronimo, Pro-
tecting Wireless Communications: A Detailed Look at Section 605 of the Com-
munications Act, 38 FED. COMM. L.J. 411, 411 n.2 (1986). This Note will refer
to this provision of the Communications Act of 1934 as § 705 unless otherwise
noted.
10. In addition to civil remedies, the CCPA provided for jail time of up to
two years as well as fines of $50,000. 47 U.S.C. § 705(d)(2), (4) (Supp. M 1985).
The SHVA increased the provision's criminal penalties, providing for imprison-
ment of up to five years and fines of up to $500,000 for each device sold. 47
U.S.C. § 705(e)(4) (1988).
11. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-20 (1988).
12. Throughout the 1980s, Congress held hearings addressing the evolving
nature of communications technology and the need for legislation to bring the
law in line with advances in technology. See, e.g., Hearings Before the Subcom-
mittee on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks of the Committee on the Judici-
ary on Privacy and Electronic Communications, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 1266
(1984); 1984: Civil Liberties and the National Security State: Hearings Before
the Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Jus-
tice, 98th Cong., 1st and 2d Sess. 133 (1984).
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about whether section 2512 of the ECPA also applies to pirated
descramblers.13 Section 2512 prohibits the manufacture and
sale of devices the design of which renders them "primarily
useful for the purpose of the surreptitious interception of...
electronic communications."1 4
The question of the proper interpretation of section 2512
affects the ECPA's capacity to protect unforeseen methods of
communication in the future. This Note suggests that both the
ECPA and the Communications Act prohibit unauthorized
descramblers because Congress intended15 each statute to regu-
late the commercial communications' 6 that descramblers inter-
cept. Part I describes Congress's recent statutory response to
increasingly sophisticated modes of communication. Part II
surveys judicial interpretations of the ECPA in cases involving
satellite descramblers. Part III critiques these interpretations
and suggests that the context and structure of the ECPA com-
pel the conclusion that the statute, like the Communications
Act, has a hybrid effect-that it governs both two-way private
communications and one-way commercial communications.
This Note concludes that construing the ECPA to ban illicit
13. Compare United States v. McNutt, 908 F.2d 561 (10th Cir. 1990) (hold-
ing that the ECPA prohibits unauthorized descramblers), cert denied, 111 S.
Ct. 955 (1991) with United States v. Herring, 933 F.2d 932 (l1th Cir. 1991)
(finding the ECPA inapplicable to descramblers) and United States v. Hux,
940 F.2d 314 (8th Cir. 1991) (following Herring). See also id. at 319 (Ross, J.,
dissenting) (concluding that the ECPA prohibits unauthorized descramblers);
United States v. Shriver, 782 F. Supp. 408 (C.D. Ill. 1992) (following Herring
and Hux); Oceanic Cablevision, Inc. v. M.D. Elec., 771 F. Supp. 1019 (D. Neb.
1991) (following McNutt).
14. 18 U.S.C. § 2512(1)(b) (1988).
15. Some commentators deny that bodies such as legislatures can form an
identifiable collective intent. See, eg., Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes' Do-
mais, 1983 U. Cm. L. REv. 533, 547 ('"Because legislatures comprise many
members, they do not have 'intents' or 'designs,' hidden yet discoverable ....
The body as a whole ... has only outcomes."). In this Note, the phrase "con-
gressional intent" and other like phrases are used for convenience to indicate
the meaning that the enacting legislators most likely assigned to the statute.
16. As used in this Note, the term "commercial communications" gener-
ally refers to communication signals which are available to the public for a
subscription fee and which usually consist of entertainment, sports, and news
programming. Cable television, subscription television, multipoint distribution
service, and direct broadcast satellite all fit this description, although each in-
volves different technology and operating characteristics. See GROSS, supra
note 3, at 53-136 (describing the development of and the differences between
these forms of commercial broadcasting). Commercial communications must
be distinguished from "commercial speech," a form of expression which is es-
sentially advertising for First Amendment purposes. See Central Hudson Gas
& Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 561 (1980).
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descramblers ensures that the statute is capable of confronting
the uncertain future of advancing communications technology.
I. UNAUTHORIZED INTERCEPTION OF
COMMUNICATIONS: THE STATUTORY
FRAMEWORK
A. TITLE III: PROTECTION OF COMMUNICATIONS PRIVACY
Throughout this century, Congress has acted to protect the
sanctity of both private and public communications. The most
prominent of the earlier statutes was the Communications Act
of 1934, which generally prohibited the interception and divul-
gence of both wire and radio communications.17 In the late
1960s, however, it became apparent that existing legislation
failed adequately to balance the demands of effective law en-
forcement with communications privacy.' 8  Attempting to
achieve this balance, Congress in 1968 reformulated the limits
17. As originally enacted, § 605 of the Communications Act provided:
No person receiving or assisting in receiving, or transmitting, or as-
sisting in transmitting, any interstate or foreign communication by
wire or radio shall divulge or publish the existence, contents, sub-
stance, purport, effect or meaning thereof .... ; and no person not be-
ing authorized by the sender shall intercept any communication .... ;
and no person not being entitled thereto shall receive or assist in re-
ceiving any interstate or foreign communication by wire or radio ....
Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, § 605, 48 Stat. 1103 (codified as amended
at 47 U.S.C. § 705(a) (1988)). The Supreme Court initially held that this provi-
sion barred the use of intercepted communications in federal criminal trials.
Weiss v. United States, 308 U.S. 321, 331 (1939); Nardone v. United States, 302
U.S. 379, 382 (1937). The Court later ruled that only parties to intercepted
conversations had standing to suppress such evidence. Goldstein v. United
States, 316 U.S. 114, 122 (1942).
In the modern era, courts have held that satellite transmissions constitute
"radio communications" within the purview of the Communications Act. E.g.,
Home Box Office, Inc. v. Corinth Motel, Inc., 647 F. Supp. 1186, 1189 (N.D.
Miss. 1986); Entertainment & Sports Programming Network, Inc. v. Edinburg
Community Hotel, Inc., 735 F. Supp. 1334, 1338 (S.D. Tex. 1986); see also Di
Geronimo, supra note 9, at 415 (asserting that courts have "stretched" the
original provision to include television, satellite, and microwave broadcasts).
18. See Stephen L. Sapp, Note, Private Interceptions of Wire and Oral
Communications Under Title III: Rethinking Congressional Intent, 16 AM. J.
CRIM. L. 181, 183-84 (1989). On the one hand, "privacy of communication [wa]s
seriously jeopardized by [electronic surveillance techniques] .... New protec-
tions for privacy [had to] be enacted." S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 1,
67, 69 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2154, 2156. On the other
hand, the Communications Act's ban on wiretapping handicapped law enforce-
ment efforts since, for instance, "'intercepting the communications of organ-
ized criminals is the only effective method of learning about their activities."'
Sapp, supra, at 185 n.25 (quoting S. REP. No. 1097, supra, at 72, reprinted in
1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2159).
1454 [Vol. 76:1451
COMMUNICATIONS PIRACY
on the interception of such communications by enacting Title
III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act (Title
III).'9
Title III originally protected wire and oral communications
from unauthorized aural interception20 and delineated the pro-
cedures that law enforcement officials must follow to receive
permission from courts to tap phone lines.2 ' Although Con-
19. Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 212 (codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions of 18 U.S.C.). The Supreme Court provided the immediate impetus for
congressional action by declaring that the government could tap phone lines
upon satisfying rigid Fourth Amendment conditions. See Berger v. New York,
388 U.S. 41 (1967); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). The Katz Court
found that the government's bugging of a phone booth constituted a search
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 353. The Court thus
recognized that the privacy interests at stake in wiretap cases are significant
enough to invoke constitutional protections. The Court held such searches
generally require a warrant based on probable cause. Id. at 356. Title I es-
sentially codified the Court's constitutional mandates. See S. REP. No. 1097,
supra note 18, at 75, reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2163 ('Working from
the hypothesis that any wiretapping and electronic surveillance legislation
should include... constitutional standards, the subcommittee has used the
Berger and Katz decisions as a guide in drafting Mitle i.").
20. 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (1982), amended by 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (1988). "Intercep-
tions" under Title II were confined to "aural acquisition[s]" of the contents of
wire and oral communications and thus did not include the acquisition of data
or other information by sight or other methods. See 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4) (1982),
amended by 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4) (1988). This restrictive definition often pro-
duced absurd results, tacitly condoning certain invasions of privacy. For exam-
ple, the statute did not apply to pen registers, devices that decode electric
phone line impulses, because the registers "do not hear sound" and therefore
"do not accomplish the 'aural acquisition' of anything." United States v. New
York Telephone Co., 434 U.S. 159, 167 (1977). Similarly, the Fourth Circuit
found Title HI inapplicable to the interception of communications between
two computers because the word "aural" requires some kind of sound element.
United States v. Seidlitz, 589 F.2d 152, 157 (4th Cir. 1978), cert denied, 441 U.S.
922 (1979); see also Michigan Bell Tel. Co. v. United States, 565 F.2d 385, 388
(6th Cir. 1977) (holding that devices which neither hear nor monitor conversa-
tions "d[o] not accomplish an 'aural acquisition' "); United States v. Gregg, 629
F. Supp. 958, 962 (W.D. Mo. 1986) (holding that Title I did not prohibit the
interception of telex communications because such interception does not entail
the "aural acquisition" of communications).
21. 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (1982), amended by 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (1988). Title II
also made significant changes to the Communications Act. First, it assumed
near exclusive jurisdiction over wire communications by generally removing
the term "wire" from the Communications Act. See Richard L. Brown &
Lauritz S. Helland, Section 605 of the Communications Act: Teaching A Salty
Old Sea Dog New Tricks, 34 CATH. U. L. REV. 635, 664 (1985); see also Edwards
v. State Farm Ins. Co., 833 F.2d 535, 538 (5th Cir. 1987) (explaining that the
Communications Act no longer governed interception of most wire communi-
cations after the passage of Title II). Title I also exempted law enforcement
officers from the definition of "person" in § 705. Bruce E. Fein, Regulating the
Interception and Disclosure of Wire, Radio, and Oral Communications: A
1992] 1455
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gress intended Title III to aid the government in apprehending
criminals, 22 the other overriding purpose of the statute was to
prevent unauthorized interception of private person-to-person
communications.23 Thus, Congress sought to ensure privacy of
communications transmitted by wire24 and those made orally
by criminalizing their interception and by conferring upon ag-
grieved parties a civil right of action against individuals who in-
tercept protected communications.2
To bolster Title III's protection of privacy, section 2512 of
Title III outlawed the sale or manufacture of devices designed
to intercept wire and oral communications. 26 The legislative
Case Study of Federal Statutory Antiquation, 22 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 47, 59
(1985). The effect of this change was to remove all limits, besides the Fourth
Amendment, on the authority of law enforcement officials to intercept and di-
vulge radio communications. Id. at 61.
22. See S. REP. No. 1097, supra note 18, at 66, reprinted in 1968
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2153; see also Fein, supra note 21, at 56 (asserting that "[tihe
overarching purpose of [T]itle III was to establish standards and procedures
for the investigative use of wiretapping or electronic eavesdropping"); Cori D.
Stephens, Note, All's Fair: No Remedy Under Title III for Interspousal Sur-
veillance, 57 FORDHAM L. REv. 1035, 1040 (1989) (arguing that Congress en-
acted Title III to buttress the fight against organized crime).
23. S. REP. No. 1097, supra note 18, at 66, reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N.
at 2153; see Gelbard v. United States, 408 U.S. 41, 48 (1972); United States v.
Cianfrani, 573 F.2d 835, 856 (3d Cir. 1978); Cox Cable Cleveland Area v. King,
582 F. Supp. 376, 382 (N.D. Ohio 1983) (suggesting that Title M prohibited
"surreptitously learn[ing] the contents of private, business or personal commu-
nications made over the telephone[,] not the unlawful interception of cable tel-
evision programming"); Alan Gadlin, Note, Title III Protection for Wireless
Telephones, 1985 U. ILL. L. REV. 143, 152 (explaining that the "congressional
drafters expressed concern with protecting conversation, not one-way commer-
cial broadcasts").
24. Title III originally protected only those wire communications trans-
mitted via lines operated by "common carriers" involved in interstate or for-
eign commerce. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(1) (1982), amended by 18 U.S.C. § 2510(1)
(1988).
25. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2511, 2520 (1982), amended by 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-
2511, 2520 (1988).
26. (1) Except as otherwise specifically provided in this chapter, any
person who willfully ... (b) manufactures, assembles, possesses, or
sells any electronic, mechanical, or other device, knowing or having
reason to know that the design of such device renders it primarily
useful for the purpose of the surreptitious interception of wire or oral
communications, and that such device or any component thereof has
been or will be sent through the mail or transported in interstate or
foreign commerce.., shall be fined not more than $10,000 or impris-
oned not more than five years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 2512(1)(b) (1982), amended by 18 U.S.C. § 2512(1)(b) (1988); see also
S. REP. No. 1097, supra note 18, at 69, reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2156
(asserting that "[ain attack must also be made on the possession, distribution,
manufacture, and advertising of intercepting devices"). The statute, however,
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history states that this provision bans devices such as micro-
phones disguised as cuff links or other objects which can
secretly record conversation.27 The Fifth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals in 1978 offered the first detailed construction of section
2512.8 In United States v. Schweihs,29 the court reversed a con-
viction under section 2512(1)(b), which prohibits possession of
eavesdropping devices.30 Schweihs used an ordinary amplifier
to construct a device that would evade an electronic alarm sys-
tem during a burglary.31 He argued that the amplifier was "not
by design primarily useful for surreptitious interception such as
granted no corresponding private right of action against the manufacturers of
such equipment. See 18 U.S.C. § 2520 (1982), amended by 18 U.S.C. § 2520
(1988) ("Any person whose wire or oral communication is intercepted, dis-
closed, or used in violation of this chapter shall (1) have a civil cause of action
against any person who intercepts, discloses, or uses, or procures any other
person to intercept, disclose, or use such communications."); Flowers v. Tandy
Corp., 773 F.2d 585, 589 (4th Cir. 1985).
27. S. REP. No. 1097, supra note 18, at 95, reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N.
at 2183. Congress intended to limit the application of § 2512 to devices, though
having innocent uses, whose principal function was to intercept protected
communications:
The statutory phrase is intended to establish a relatively narrow cate-
gory of devices whose principal use is likely to be for wiretapping or
eavesdropping. A device will not escape the prohibition merely be-
cause it may have innocent uses. The crucial test is whether the de-
sign of the device renders it primarily useful for surreptitious
listening.
Id The Report then gave examples of prohibited devices: "[Tihe martini olive
transmitter, the spike mike[,] . . . and the microphone disguised as a wrist-
watch, picture frame, cuff link, tie clip, fountain pen, stapler, or cigarette
pack." Id.
28. Prior to this time, Title M had withstood attacks on constitutional
grounds. Congress enacted Title Ill pursuant to its authority under the Com-
merce Clause. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. In United States v. Reed, 489
F.2d 917 (6th Cir. 1974), the court upheld defendant's conviction under 18
U.S.C. § 2512(1)(b) for possession of an instrument (a tape recorder connected
to insulated conducter wire with a phone plug and two alligator clips) knowing
that it was "'primarily useful for surreptitious interception of wire... com-
munications,' and that it had previously moved in interstate commerce." Id at
918. The court found § 2512 a proper exercise of Congress's authority, as it
"was clearly Congress'[s] intention to respond to a national problem intimately
affecting interstate commerce by a national solution." Id. at 919. That the
"possession, manufacture, distribution, advertising, and use of [such] devices
[were] facilitated by interstate commerce" further supported the court's con-
clusion. Id at 920; see also United States v. Novel, 444 F.2d 114, 114 (9th Cir.
1971) (per curiam) (holding that § 2512 is not unconstitutionally vague and
ambiguous).
29. 569 F.2d 965 (5th Cir. 1978).
30. Id. at 967.
31. Id.
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is proscribed by [section 2512]."32 The court agreed, holding
that although the device was capable of intercepting protected
communications, it was distinguishable from the devices that
Congress listed in the legislative history because it "reveal[ed]
no design characteristics which suggest surreptitious listening
as its primary function."' 3 Thus, because the amplifier's design
did not render it "primarily useful" for surreptitious intercep-
tion, it fell outside of section 2512.34
B. COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY OUTPACFS CONGRESS
In the years following the passage of Title III, rapid ad-
vances in communications technology quickly rendered the
statute obsolete.-3 In the 1970s and 1980s, businesses and con-
sumers began using a wide variety of communication networks
that Title III was ill-equipped to regulate: cellular telephones,
electronic pagers, electronic bulletin boards and computers,
among others.36 By the early 1980s, use of these new modes of
communication rivaled that of phone calls and face-to-face con-
versation.3 7 Although such modern communications are readily
32. Id.
33. Id at 969. The court found that the device was "basically an ordinary
amplifier" that could be "used in conjunction with radios, phonographs, and
other audio equipment." Id. Thus, its design rendered it useful mainly for le-
gitimate activities.
34. Id. In United States v. Bast, 495 F.2d 138 (D.C. Cir. 1974), another fed-
eral court held that "surreptitious interception" simply means "secret listen-
ing." Id, at 143.
35. Robert W. Kastenmeier et al., Communications Privacy: A Legisla-
tive Perspective, 1989 WIS. L. REv. 715, 718, 719; see also Fein, supra note 21, at
67-80, 90-93 (arguing that technological and market changes had so altered pre-
vailing conditions that the literal application of Title I produced absurd or
conflicting results).
36. One commentator suggested that "the applicability of Title III to cel-
lular [and cordless telephone] transmissions... was ambiguous at best." Rus-
sell S. Burnside, The Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986: The
Challenge of Applying Ambiguous Statutory Language to Intricate Telecom-
munication Technologies, 13 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 451, 497 &
n.304 (1987). Moreover, the limited definition of "interception" deprived many
types of communications, including text, digital, and machine communications,
of protection. See Kastenmeier et al., supra note 35, at 718. Finally, not only
did Title III leave electronic communications unprotected, it also exposed wire
communications transmitted by "noncommon carrier[s]" to interception be-
cause it protected only those wire communications transmitted by "common
carriers." 18 U.S.C. § 2510(1) (1982), amended by 18 U.S.C. § 2510(1) (1988).
Since AT&T's court-ordered divestiture in the early 1980s, callers place most
local calls through such noncommon carriers. Fein, supra note 21, at 66.
37. "American citizens and American businesses are using these new
forms of technology [communications transmitted by new noncommon carrier
1458 [Vol. 76:1451
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susceptible to interception, 38 the 1968 Act offered them ques-
tionable protection because of its confined scope.
The rapid evolution in technology not only changed the na-
ture of two-way communications but also gave rise to a new
form of one-way commercial communication: satellite televi-
sion broadcasting. By the late 1970s, many pay-television chan-
nels began relying on satellites for transmitting their
broadcasts.39 The development of antennas to receive these sig-
nals corresponded with the boom in satellite broadcasting.4°
These antennas, known as "home earth stations" or "satellite
communication services or new forms of telecommunications and computer
technology] in lieu of, or side-by-side with, first class mail and common carrier
telephone services." S. REP. No. 541, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1986), reprinted in
1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3559. For example, "data transmission and computer
systems have become a pervasive part of the business and home environ-
ments." Kastenmeier et al., supra note 35, at 726.
38. "Americans have lost the ability to lock away a great deal of personal
and business information." S. REP. No. 541, supra note 37, at 3, reprinted in
1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3557. For examples of inadvertent interceptions of cord-
less telephone conversations, see State v. Howard, 679 P.2d 197 (Kan. 1984);
State v. Delaurier, 488 A.2d 688 (R.I. 1985); see also Burnside, supra note 36, at
454 (asserting that "the ongoing proliferation of computers and advanced elec-
tronic communications continually simplifies the ability to access a broad
range of information about people, businesses, and organizations"); Fred J.
Meyer, Note, Don't Touch That DiaL Radio Listening Under the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act of 1986,63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 416,416 (1988) ("Mhe
voices of cellular mobile telephone users are transmitted over frequencies
which can be received on many television sets."); cf United States v. Miller,
425 U.S. 435 (1976) (finding that a customer has no standing to challenge dis-
closure of his bank records).
39. See Owen, supra note 1, at 47-48. Although networks transmitted spe-
cial events to American televisions via satellite as early as 1964, programmers
did not begin to use satellites for regular broadcasting until the mid-1970s. Id-
at 47. "[Television was not a priority of early communications satellites,
which had to shut down all their other transmissions... in order to carry a
single channel of television." Id. at 46. But in 1974, Western Union launched
"America's first genuine domestic-communications satellite," the Westar I. Id.
at 47. CBS began using Westar during the same year to broadcast pay pro-
grams. Sheila B. Mangel, Home Satellite TV Viewers: Pirates or Just Aiming
in the Right Direction?, CoMM. & L., Feb. 1988, at 31, 33. In 1975, the en-
tertainment network, Home Box Office (HBO), began transmitting regular
programming via Westar I to its cable affiliates. Owen, supra note 1, at 47.
Satellites were put in "geosynchronous" orbits to optimize their use. Geo-
synchrous satellites orbit the earth at an altitude of 22,300 miles. At this alti-
tude, the satellite's orbital period is the same as the earth's, thus allowing a
programmer to transmit through the same satellite at all times without being
blocked by the curvature of the earth. Id.
40. HBO made its first broadcast by satellite on September 30, 1975 when
it aired the "Thrilla in Manila," the heavyweight title fight between Muham-
mad Ali and Joe Frazier. Owen,.supra note 1, at 47. Soon after this broadcast,
H. Taylor Howard, a Stanford electrical engineering professor, constructed the
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dishes," receive satellite signals that conventional television
sets can recognize.41
The dish industry soon flourished because antennas allow
private homes to intercept satellite signals intended for cable
affiliates,42 thus circumventing the monthly charges affiliates
impose on their customers who receive signals through coaxial
cable wire.43 By the early 1980s, thousands of individuals across
the country received dozens of premium channels for one
lump-sum payment-the cost of a satellite dish.44
The explosion of dish sales in the early 1980s raised a host
of troubling political and legal questions. Because the Commu-
first home earth station. Id. Taylor offered to pay HBO for the free program-
ming he began receiving, but the company failed to respond to his offer. Id.
41. See GRoss, supra note 3, at 31. Dishes are also known as "television
receive only (TVRO) earth stations." Gary E. Bishop & Scott Eads, The Home
Satellite Dish Antenna: Will the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984
Descramble the Unauthorized Viewing Controversy?, 25 WASHBURN L.J. 66,
66-67 (1985). These antennas receive, amplify, and convert into usable form
television signals disseminated by communications satellites. Id Home earth
stations enable owners to receive signals directly from communications satel-
lites and view them on conventional television sets. Di Geronimo, supra note
9, at 413. Programmers intend for cable affiliates to receive these signals and
retransmit them to paying customers. H.R. REP. No. 887(11), supra note 5, at
11, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5639-40.
42. Mangel, supra note 39, at 36. More generally, "[t]hrough the use of
this exciting technology, Americans in even the remotest corners of our land
have been able to fully participate in and benefit from a revolution in commu-
nications .... Through the use of home satellite antennas, individuals are
able to view scores of channels of programming, much of which was un-
dreamed of just a decade ago." Hearings on H.R. 3378 Before the Subcommit-
tee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the
Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, 99th Cong., 1st Sess.
392 (1986) (statement of Richard L. Brown, General Counsel, Satellite Televi-
sion Industry Association, Inc. (SPACE)).
43. By using a home earth station in conjunction with a frequency tuner,
a dish owner is able to intercept signals directly from a communications satel-
lite and receive the programming on a conventional television set. Indeed,
"most of the programs [we]re simply snatched from the more than two dozen
communication satellites." Di Geronimo, supra note 9, at 414.
44. Initially, satellite dishes were prohibitively expensive for the average
American. In 1980, for example, Neiman-Marcus offered packages for about
$36,000. Mangel, supra note 39, at 31. Prices dropped precipitously as demand
grew, so much so that by 1985 a complete system cost less than $2,500. Owen,
supra note 1, at 50. While consumers bought only 5,000 dishes in 1980, by 1985
there were one million operating across the country. Bishop & Eads, supra
note 41, at 67.
"The classic TVRO ... owner lives in a rural, uncabled area with access to
fewer than three over-the-air television signals .... [Sixty-one] percent [of
dish owners] said their primary reason [for purchasing a system] was to have
access to a wider variety of programming." Mangel, supra note 39, at 32.
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nications Act of 1934 prohibited interception of radio signals, 45
it arguably criminalized the use of home earth stations.4 In-
deed, satellite dishes enabled their owners to "steal" the prop-
erty of program suppliers. 47 The only way programmers could
ensure payment for the viewing of their signals was "signal
scrambling," a technique by which programmers render dishes
useless without the purchase of a special "descrambler" unit
that translates the now-unintelligible signal.48 The dish indus-
try and its customers consequently feared the devaluation of
their substantial investment by programmers using scrambling.
Thus, besides outpacing Title III and exposing private commu-
nications to ready intrusion, technological advances created
45. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
46. Even before Congress amended § 705 of the Communications Act in
1984, courts suggested that it prohibited the interception of satellite transmis-
sions by commercial establishments, which used the broadcasts to attract cus-
tomers but neglected to pay programmers for them. See, e.g., National
Football League v. Cousin Hugo's, Inc., 600 F. Supp. 84, 87 (E.D. Mo. 1984); Na-
tional Football League v. Alley, Inc., 624 F. Supp. 6, 9-10 (S.D. Fla. 1983). The
unanswered question, however, was whether the reception of signals for pri-
vate viewing at home violated § 705.
47. See Robert D. Haymer, Comment, Who Owns the Air? Unscrambling
the Satellite Viewing Rights Dilemma, 20 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 145, 145 (1986)
(arguing that private property rights exist in television signals because the
product carried on the signals is expensive to produce and disseminate and
broadcasts would no longer be aired if signals were free for all to access); cf.
Cable/Home Communication v. Network Prods., 902 F.2d 829, 850 (11th Cir.
1990) (explaining that First Amendment right of access to transmitted signals
does not extend to subscription television); California Satellite Sys. v. Seimon,
767 F.2d 1364, 1367-68 (9th Cir. 1985) (same).
48. Programmers realized that dish owners were receiving signals for no
charge. Thus, by 1982 HBO announced plans for signal scrambling. Stover,
supra note 2, at 71. The scrambling systems operate as follows:
[P]rogrammers ... beam their signals up to satellites using equipment
by General Instrument Corp., a San Diego firm that also sells the
descrambling boxes, called VideoCiphers, used by dish owners. The
programmers send scrambled signals to their satellites keyed to each
dish owner's box. The signal can "talk" to each box, telling it
whether the programming has been paid for and whether to receive
it.
Terry Carter, Satellite TV Pirates Plying the Airwaves, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 12,
1987, at 1, 37. M/A-Com, Inc. developed the first descrambler system, known
as the VideoCipher II. Stover, supra note 2, at 71. General Instruments Cor-
poration manufactures descramblers using this system, which has become the
industry standard. Scrambling of Signals, supra note 8, at 1204-05.
Because of the security problems inherent in many modem telecommuni-
cations systems such as cellular phones, experts suggest that scrambling is also
the only way to ensure the privacy of such communications. See Privacy Pro-
tections, COMM. DAILy, June 13, 1991, at 4.
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confusion over the allocation of various property interests in
commercial communications.
C. CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE: THE MODERNIZATION OF
COMMUNICATIONS LEGISLATION
Congress reacted to the communications revolution by en-
acting curative legislation. In 1984, Congress passed the Cable
Communications Policy Act of 1984 (CCPA),49 taking a first
step toward addressing property rights in commercial commu-
nications. Section 705 of the CCPA amended the Communica-
tions Act and attempted to balance the competing interests of
dish owners and programmers. It expressly legalized the use of
dishes50 and the reception of unscrambZed signals, and it ex-
tended protection to scrambled satellite signals.51 The CCPA
thus allowed satellite programmers to protect their property
rights through signal scrambling.5 2 Moreover, the CCPA cre-
ated criminal and civil liability for manufacturers of unauthor-
49. Pub. L. No. 98-549, 98 Stat. 2779 (codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions of 47 U.S.C.). The CCPA left intact the Communication Act's ban on the
interception of radio communications, but added a provision exempting un-
scrambled satellite communications from the first section's broad ban. See 47
U.S.C. § 705(b) (1988).
50. "The main purpose behind the enactment of section [7105(b) was to
'[make] it clear that the manufacture, sale and home use of earth stations are
legal activities."' Sioux Falls Cable Television v. South Dakota, 838 F.2d 249,
252 (8th Cir. 1988) (quoting 130 CONG. REC. H10,446 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1984)
(statement of Rep. Rose)).
51. Section 705(a) of the CCPA adopted the language of the Communica-
tions Act of 1934, which provided broad protection to radio signals. See supra
note 17 and accompanying text. Section 705(b) stated that § 705(a) would not
apply to the interception of satellite cable programming for private viewing if
"the programming involved is not encrypted" and the programmer has not es-
tablished a marketing system under which "an agent or agents have been law-
fully designated for the purpose of authorizing private viewing by individuals."
47 U.S.C. § 705(b) (1988). Thus, the provisions of § 705(a) apply to the inter-
ception of encrypted signals. See Di Geronimo, supra note 9, at 429. Moreover,
the exception the CCPA created for private viewing of protected transmissions
does not apply "to the receipt of satellite signals for commercial advantage, re-
transmission, or public display." I&
One commentator has argued, however, that despite strong precedent to
the contrary, courts should construe § 705 to protect only private communica-
tions and that the more appropriate cause of action for piracy of pay program-
ming is under copyright law. See Lauritz S. Helland, Section 705(a) in the
Modern Communications World: A Response to Di Geronimo, 40 FED. COMM.
L.J. 115, 126-27 (1988).
52. "The amendments made by this legislation are intended.., to provide
satellite cable program suppliers in the future with two clear alternatives for
the protection of their satellite transmissions. They may either scramble their
signal, or [formally market their broadcasts]." 130 CONG. REC. S14,286 (daily
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ized satellite descramblers 53 and cable decoders.-4
As programmers began scrambling their signals in re-
sponse to the CCPA,- home earth station sales rapidly de-
clined56 because dish owners now had to purchase descrambler
units and pay monthly fees to programmers. 57 Enterprising tin-
kerers exploited consumer anger58 caused by these extra costs
ed. Oct. 11, 1984) (statement of Sen. Packwood), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4655, 4745.
53. Section 705(d)(4) prohibited "[tihe importation, manufacture, sale, or
distribution of equipment by any person with the intent of its use to assist in
any activity prohibited by subsection (a)." 47 U.S.C. § 705(d)(4) (Supp. HI
1985), amended by 47 U.S.C. § 705(e)(4) (1988). By prohibiting devices which
assist in violating § 705(a), § 705(d)(4) prohibited unauthorized descrambler
sales. See Cable/Home Communication v. Network Prods., 902 F.2d 829, 848
(11th Cir. 1990); Di Geronimo, supra note 9, at 429.
54. See 47 U.S.C. § 553 (1988); see also H.R. REP. No. 934, 98th Cong., 2d
Sess. 84 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4655, 4721 (explaining that this
provision is "primarily aimed at preventing the manufacture and distribution
of so-called 'black boxes' and other unauthorized converters which permit re-
ception of cable service without paying for the service").
Some courts had held that the Communications Act of 1934 by its own
terms proscribed the black market sale of such devices. For a comprehensive
collection of such cases, see United States v. Herring, 933 F.2d 932, 933 n.2
(11th Cir. 1991). One commentator criticized the application of the Communi-
cations Act to unauthorized decoding devices before the 1984 amendments, ar-
guing that doing so required unduly broadening the statute's language. See
Russell W. Chittenden, Note, The Piracy of Subscription Television: An Alter-
native to the Communications Law, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 935, 941 (1983); see also
Telerate Sys., Inc. v. Caro, 689 F. Supp. 221, 231 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (explaining
that courts applied a legal fiction to bring interception devices within the am-
bit of former § 605); Brown & Helland, supra note 21, at 664 (criticizing courts
for applying former § 605 to the sale of unauthorized cable decoders).
55. Soon after the CCPA's passage in 1984, HBO became the first major
programmer to protect its broadcasts through signal scrambling. Carter, supra
note 48, at 37.
56. While dish sales totalled 90,000 per month as of September, 1985, by
February of 1986 they had dropped to 16,000. Moreover, nearly one half of all
home earth station dealers went out of business in 1986. Stover, supra note 2,
at 71.
57. After programmers began scrambling, the dish industry and home
earth station owners expressed concern over the availability and pricing of
broadcasts. The legislative history to the SHVA discussed the issue:
Many home dish owners have stated objections to the scrambling and
current marketing practices of satellite delivered video programming
because they believe that they have a right to receive satellite pro-
gramming at a price comparable to that paid by cable system subscrib-
ers to the same programming. Some consumers have expressed
concern about the cost of descrambling devices; price discrimination
for programming services available to dish owners, and access to the
programming available to cable subscribers.
H.R. REP. No. 887(H), supra note 5, at 11, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
5640.
58. A satellite dish retailer interrupted an HBO program for several min-
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by developing a successful black market in descrambler units.59
As a result, programmers continued to lose millions of dollars
in revenue annually.60
Congress emphasized the protection of privacy interests in
its next communications legislation. In 1986, Congress
amended Title III by enacting the Electronic Communications
Privacy Act (ECPA).6 ' The ECPA corrected defects in Title HI
which had exposed many business and personal communica-
tions to unauthorized interception.62 Indeed, Congress sought
utes with a message in protest of the high cost of receiving scrambled signals.
The media dubbed this event the "Captain Midnight" incident, after the pseu-
donym used by the retailer. Mangel, supra note 39, at 41-42.
59. The purchase of an unauthorized descrambler enables the buyer to
pay a one-time fee and avoid subscription payments. As of 1990, estimates in-
dicated that from 50% to 80% of dish owners did not pay for the satellite pro-
gramming they received. The Need for a Universal Encryption Standard for
Satellite Cable Programming, 5 F.C.C.R. 2710, 2714 (1990); see also Peter D.
Lambert, SBCA: Programmers, Piracy, Compression, BROADCASTING, Jan. 28,
1991, at 54 (indicating that a large but unknown number of dish owners pirate
signals).
One common method of altering descramblers--"cloning'"-works as
follows:
[A] "master" decoder is legally authorized to receive all scrambled
services (by payment of regular subscription fees to the program-
mers). Then, information on the "master" decoder's authorization is
extracted. That information is programmed into pirate chips that are
then sold. Buyers of the pirate chips can attach them to their decod-
ers, and those decoders will be authorized to receive all services for
which the "master" decoder has a current subscription.
Scrambling of Signals, supra note 8, at 1205. By cloning a chip from one legiti-
mate unit, pirates can produce great numbers of unauthorized systems at little
expense. Carter, supra note 48, at 37. Another method, known as the "Three
Musketeers" technique, involves subscribing to one programming service and
using a pirated chip to receive all other services without payment. See
Cable/Home Communication v. Network Prods., 902 F.2d 829, 835 (11th Cir.
1990). The legal remedies available against those who produce and sell pirated
chips also include actions for copyright infringement. See id. at 842-47.
Descrambler pirates even began to organize, founding an organization
called the Digital Encryption Standard Users Group (DESUG). Carter, supra
note 48, at 37. The group is dedicated to devising a "standalone descrambler
that would decode the signals without the dish owner's having to buy and alter
the VideoCipher device." 1d.
60. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
61. Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (codified in scattered sections of 18
U.S.C.).
62. "The [ECPA] cure[d] many of the ambiguities and antiquities of [Title
III]." Burnside, supra note 36, at 494. For instance, Congress abandoned Title
III's common carrier requirement. See 18 U.S.C. § 2510(1) (1988); see also S.
REP. No. 541, supra note 37, at 11, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3565 (ex-
plaining that the amended statute "deletes from the definition of 'wire com-
munication' the requirement that communications must be transmitted via
common carrier").
1464 [Vol. 76:1451
COMMUNICATIONS PIRACY
to protect communications transmitted electronically from in-
trusion.63 These included video teleconferences, electronic
mail, pager messages, and other, similar communications. 64
The ECPA's definition of "electronic communications" is
broad.r The ECPA expanded section 2512 to proscribe devices
designed for the surreptitious interception of electronic com-
munications in addition to wire and oral communications. 66
Moreover, the ECPA broadened its predecessor's restrictive
definition of "interception." Congress amended the definition
to include not only "aural" but "other acquisition[s]" of pro-
tected communications. 67 Taken as a whole, the ECPA thus
63. "The purpose of the legislation is to amend [Title M] to prohibit the
interception of certain electronic communications." H.R. REP. No. 647, 99th
Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1986). One conspicuous exception is cordless radio tele-
phone communications. Because Congress considered such transmissions too
easily accessible to the general public, it declined to make interception of them
a criminal offense. See Burnside, supra note 36, at 496-97.
Congress brought cellular phone calls within the ECPA's protection by
amending the definition of "wire communications." Id. at 497. One commen-
tator has argued that, because cellular phone calls are also easy to intercept
with standard electronic scanners and because detecting interceptions is next
to impossible, the ECPA has "absolutely no effect on the security of cellular
telephones." Robert Corn-Revere, Cellular Phones: Only the Illusion of Pri-
vacy, NETWORK WORLD, Aug. 28, 1989, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
Communications News File.
64. See S. REP. No. 541, supra note 37, at 14, reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3568.
65. 'Electronic communication" includes "any transfer of signs, signals,
writing, images, sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature transmitted in
whole or in part by a wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectric or photoopti-
cal system that affects interstate or foreign commerce . . . ." 18 U.S.C.
§ 2510(12) (1988) (emphasis added).
The Senate Report states that "[a]s a general rule, a communication is an
electronic communication protected by [the ECPA] if it is not carried by sound
waves and cannot fairly be characterized as containing the human voice." S.
REP. No. 541, supra note 37, at 14, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C-A.N. at 3568. The
Report later suggests, however, that the term includes video teleconferences.
Id Video teleconferences contain the human voice. See United States v. Mc-
Nutt, 908 F.2d 561, 564 (10th Cir. 1990), cert denied, 111 S. Ct. 955 (1991).
Thus, the precise scope of the term "electronic communications" is unclear.
66. 18 U.S.C. § 2512(1)(b) (1988). Congress devoted only minimal discus-
sion to § 2512 in the legislative history. The Senate Report merely reiterates
that § 2512 "prohibits the manufacture, distribution, possession, and advertis-
ing only of devices primarily useful for surreptitious interception." S. REP.
No. 541, supra note 37, at 13, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C-A.N. at 3567. It also
points out that the state of mind required to violate § 2512 was changed from
"willful" to "intentional." Id. at 23, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3577.
67. See 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4) (1988); see also S. REP. No. 541, supra note 37,
at 13, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3567 ('Th[e] amendment clarifies that
it is illegal to intercept the non-voice portion of a wire communication. For
example, it is illegal to intercept the data or digitized portion of a voice com-
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embodied Congress's desire that "the law . . . advance with
technology. '68
While the ECPA provided modernized privacy protection,
Congress believed that neither it nor the CCPA had adequately
resolved the dilemma over property rights in commercial com-
munications. For this reason, Congress returned to the issue of
access rights to satellite pay-television transmissions by enact-
ing the Satellite Home Viewer Act of 1988 (SHVA). 69 The Act
amended section 705 of the Communications Act in several re-
spects. First, it raised the penalties provided by the CCPA for
acts related to piracy of satellite programming.70 Moreover, the
SHVA amended the CCPA's broad prohibition of interception
devices by adding language outlawing the sale or manufacture
of devices "primarily of assistance in the unauthorized decryp-
tion of satellite cable programming." 71 Finally, the statute ex-
panded private standing to sue in order to "encourag[e] inter-
industry effort to deal with piracy. '72 In addition to deterring
piracy, the SHVA sought to ensure dish owners fair access to
satellite pay-television programming.73 By so extending the
provisions of the CCPA, Congress took another step toward
modernizing the law as it relates to property rights in commer-
cial satellite broadcasts.
Congressional efforts in the 1980s clarified the problems as-
sociated with the advances in communications technology fol-
lowing the enactment of Title III. The privacy of most two-way
electronic communications is now beyond dispute; dish owners
may intercept unencrypted programming for private viewing
with impunity. The manufacture of unauthorized descram-
blers, however, has not abated. Descrambler pirates now con-
stitute a more imposing threat than ever for the satellite
television industry.74
munication."). With this new definition, the statute now protects all types of
information which are susceptible to "non-aural" interception, such as data
communications, digital communications, video communications, and elec-
tronic mail. See Burnside, supra note 36, at 501-02.
68. S. REP. No. 541, supra note 37, at 5, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
3559.
69. Pub. L. No. 100-667, 102 Stat. 3958 (codified in scattered sections of 17
U.S.C. and 47 U.S.C.).
70. See H.R. REP. No. 887(11), supra note 5, at 28, reprinted in 1988
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5657.
71. 47 U.S.C. § 705(e)(4) (1988).
72. H.R. REP. No. 887(11), supra note 5, at 29, reprinted in 1988
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5658.
73. 1d. at 10, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5638.
74. "Clearly the VideoCipher II has been a disaster from a security point
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II. THE ECPA IN THE COURTS
By amending section 705 of the Communications Act under
both the CCPA and the SHVA, Congress created one obvious
means of combating descrambler piracy. Prosecutors, however,
have seemed to ignore section 705, but have brought charges
against descrambler pirates under the ECPA.75 The federal cir-
cuits are now in conflict over whether the ECPA applies to the
marketing of unauthorized descramblers.76
The interpretive dilemma over the ECPA became evident
soon after the passage of the Act. In 1988, the Federal Commu-
nications Commission 77 suggested that both the ECPA and the
Communications Act prohibit unauthorized descramblers78 but
it also ignored the ECPA in a discussion about descrambler
piracy.79 The FCC's own ambivalence foreshadowed the diffi-
culties courts would have in construing the ECPA.
In 1990, the Tenth Circuit became the first appeals court to
address the ECPA's application to descramblers. The court
held in United States v. McNutt 80 that section 2512 of the
ECPA outlawed the sale and manufacture of unauthorized sat-
ellite descramblers.81 It upheld McNutt's conviction for cloning
of view .... Unless we come up with better scrambling systems, satellite to
home broadcasting as a supplement to cable in low-density areas is absolutely
doomed." Malone Looks to the Future with Cable Labs, BROADCASTING, June
5, 1989, at 76, 77 (emphasis added). Robert Caird, the chairman of the indus-
try's trade association, the Satellite Broadcasting and Communications Associ-
ation (SBCA), warned that "the 'pollution' of signal theft 'left unchecked...
can wipe out any potential role [that satellite broadcasters] can play in the
telecommunications industry.'" Lambert, supra note 59, at 55.
75. See United States v. Herring, 933 F.2d 932, 935 (11th Cir. 1991) (ex-
plaining that an attorney for the government asserted in oral argument that
"only section 2512(1)(b) proscribed the manufacture and sale of [unauthorized]
satellite descramblers").
76. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
77. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) is the agency to
which Congress delegated policymaking authority in communications. See
Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, § 1, 48 Stat. 1064, 1064 (1934) (codified at
47 U.S.C. § 151 (1988)).
78. See FCC Issues Warning Against Theft of Satellite Programming, 65
Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 36, 37 (July 21, 1988) (asserting that "the marketing of
technology which is intended to be used for.., the surreptitious interception
of [satellite programming] violates section 705(d)(4) of the [Communications]
Act and... 18 USC § 2512(1)").
79. See Scrambling of Signals, supra note 8, at 1205 (mentioning only
§ 705 in a discussion of ways to combat proliferation of unauthorized
descramblers).
80. 908 F.2d 561 (10th Cir. 1990), cert denied, 111 S. Ct. 955 (1991).
81. Id. at 565. Dissenting in United States v. Hux, 940 F.2d 314 (8th Cir.
1991), Judge Ross reached the same conclusion. He felt that modified
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the electronic "addresses" of legitimate decoder units and in-
serting them into unapproved models.8 2  Analyzing the
ECPA,8 3 the court found that the plain wording of section
2510(12), which broadly defines "electronic communications," 4
encompasses satellite transmissions.85 The court then held that
unauthorized descramblers intercept these electronic communi-
cations and that, because programmers are unaware of this,
"such interception is surreptitious. '86
The Eleventh and Eighth Circuits have also recently ad-
dressed the question of the ECPA's scope. Both courts criti-
cized McNutt and reversed convictions under section 2512.87 In
United States v. Herring,88 the Eleventh Circuit suggested that
the 1986 amendments to the ECPA did not change its analysis,
analogizing unauthorized descramblers to the common ampli-
fier at issue in Schweihs.8 9 It found that the design of the
descramblers have "no legitimate use other than to facilitate the unauthorized
interception of satellite television signals." I&. at 320. Because "[t]his is not
simply the surreptitious use of a legitimate electronic device," the court should
have convicted the defendant for conduct "fall[ing] squarely within the plain
language of the statute and the legislative history." Id, In Oceanic Cablevi-
sion, Inc. v. M.D. Elecs., 771 F. Supp. 1019 (D. Neb. 1991), the plaintiff cable
programmer brought an action under § 2520 of the ECPA for the defendant's
alleged violations of § 2512, claiming that the defendant had sold unauthorized
descrambling equipment. Id. at 1022. The court, relying on McNutt, held that
the plaintiff's complaint withstood a Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)
motion. Id, at 1029. The court thus suggested that unauthorized descrambler
sales violate § 2512 and that § 2520 grants a private right of action for victims
of such violations.
82. MclAutt, 908 F.2d at 562.
83. Before addressing the ECPA, the court first concluded that McNutt
had not violated a federal statute prohibiting traffic in counterfeit access de-
vices. Id at 563-64. The court found that 18 U.S.C. § 1029 (1988) did not apply
to McNutt's sale of descramblers because McNutt's conduct did not result in
"direct accounting losses," which is an essential element of a § 1029 violation.
Id- at 564.
84. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
85. McNutt, 908 F.2d at 564. "It is undisputed that satellite television
transmissions contain sounds and images and are carried via radio waves;
therefore they constitute electronic communications under § 2510(12)." Id.
86. I& at 565. Because the legislative history is ambiguous on this issue,
the court stated that it would follow the plain statutory language because of
the language's "clarity." Id
87. See United States v. Herring, 933 F.2d 932, 939 (11th Cir. 1991); United
States v. Hux, 940 F.2d 314, 318 (8th Cir. 1991).
88. 933 F.2d 932 (11th Cir. 1991).
89. The court first reviewed § 2512 as it would have applied before Con-
gress's 1986 amendments. Id. at 933-34. It found that Title I would not have
prohibited unauthorized descramblers. Id. at 934. It also found that the ECPA
did not apply. Id at 935. This suggests that the court found that the 1986
amendments neither changed the nature of the statute nor its analysis of Title
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descramblers did not render them "primarily useful" for sur-
reptitious interception because of their potential for legitimate
use, namely descrambling "'soft scrambled' signals."'9 Because
such signals constitute ninety percent of satellite television sig-
nals and their reception requires no authorization, the court
reasoned, the design of unauthorized descramblers gives the de-
vices "significant nonsurreptitious and legitimate uses." 91
The court then examined the context within which Con-
gress enacted the amended version of section 2512. The legisla-
tive history, the court suggested, shows that Congress "fairly
clearly" intended to protect two-way personal and business
communications by passage of the ECPA and that it had not
meant to broaden the meaning of "surreptitious." 92 For these
reasons, and because it suggested that satellite television piracy
is covered exclusively by section 705 of the Communications
Act,93 the court held that the ECPA did not apply.94 In reach-
ing the same result, the Eighth Circuit closely followed this
analysis in United States v. Hux.95
III. Indeed, while acknowledging the ECPA "take[s] into account new tech-
nologies," id., the court noted that "[t]he amendments simply changed 'will-
fully' to 'intentionally' and added the phrase 'or electronic' to the section." Id.
at 934. The court concluded that "Congress did not change the meaning of the
word 'surreptitious' in its 1986 amendments to [Title III]." Id. at 935.
90. See i& at 934.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 935. More specifically, Congress did not intend for the term
"surreptitious" to "encompass devices that have legitimate uses but whose
owners use them illegitimately." Id. The court felt that Congress's silence on
this issue essentially compelled adherence to the meaning ascribed to "surrep-
titious" by the court in United States v. Schweihs, 569 F.2d 965 (5th Cir. 1978).
93. Herring, 933 F.2d at 935-37. Because the conduct at issue in Herring
occurred between November, 1987 and June, 1988, the court relied on the
CCPA's version of § 705, which prohibited the manufacture or sale of equip-
ment "with the intent of its use to assist" in the interception of protected com-
munications. Id. at 936.
94. Id. at 935. The court bolstered its conclusion by invoking traditional
principles of statutory construction. The court first cited the rule of lenity in
support of its conclusion, reasoning that the criminal penalties at stake dic-
tated a lenient interpretation of the ECPA's ambiguity. See id. at 937. The
court also employed the principle ejusdem generis. See id. at 937-38 (sug-
gesting that satellite broadcast technology differs from the technologies that
Congress stated that the ECPA covers). Recognizing that the CCPA preceded
the ECPA, the court further based its ruling on the canon disfavoring the sub-
mergence of specific statutes by subsequent general statutes. Id. at 938. Fi-
nally, the court cited Congress's decision to increase the penalties provided by
the SHVA but to leave the ECPA's penalties alone. Id It determined that this
suggests that Congress did not believe that the ECPA applies to descrambler
sales. Id-
95. 940 F.2d 314 (8th Cir. 1991). The court first examined the statutory
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III. THE ECPA AND EVOLVING COMMUNICATIONS
TECHNOLOGY
The circuit conflict over the application of section 2512
reveals two primary sources of confusion surrounding congres-
sional intent and the ECPA. The first source of confusion is
whether the statute even governs satellite cable broadcasts, the
type of communications which descramblers intercept. The sec-
ond issue is the standard of liability courts should use to iden-
tify devices prohibited under section 2512. In failing to address
these issues adequately, courts have left the statute's scope, and
its capacity to evolve with technology, in question. Although
pirated descramblers are illegal under section 705 of the Com-
munications Act, the question of the ECPA's applicability en-
capsulates the broader issue of the proper interpretation of
statutes in light of rapidly advancing technology.
A. THE ECPA's APPLICATION TO SATELLITE CABLE
COMMUNICATIONS
Section 2512 bans certain devices that intercept "electronic
communications." Courts agree that pirated descramblers in-
tercept commercial satellite broadcasts96 but are divided over
whether satellite broadcasts constitute "electronic communica-
tions" and thus fall within the scope of the ECPA. While the
Tenth Circuit in United States v. McNutt held simply that the
"plain wording of [the definition of 'electronic communica-
tions'] encompasses satellite television signals,"97 the Eleventh
Circuit in United States v. Herring suggested that Congress in-
tended that the statute regulate only private satellite communi-
authority, contrasting the ECPA with the SHVA. I- at 316. The court then
reviewed both the McNutt and Herring opinions. Id at 317. As in Herring,
the court noted that Congress apparently intended that the private viewing of
satellite programming fall exclusively under § 705. Id Moreover, the court
suggested that the absence of any mention by Congress of scrambled satellite
signals in the ECPA's legislative history also tended to favor Herring's result.
Id Acknowledging the difficulty of the interpretive issue, the court found that
the many factors that the Herring court relied upon compelled a reversal of
Hux's conviction under the ECPA. Id at 318. The court found Herring the
"better reasoned approach in considering the past and present legislative his-
tory, prior case law, principles of statutory construction, and the provisions of
47 U.S.C. § [7]05." Id
96. See id at 315; Herring, 933 F.2d at 932; United States v. McNutt, 908
F.2d 561, 562-63 (10th Cir. 1990), cert denied, 111 S. Ct. 955 (1991).
97. McNutt, 908 F.2d at 564. The court relied on § 2510(12) of the ECPA,
which broadly defines "electronic communications." See supra note 65.
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cations.98 The Herring court reasoned that the legislative
history of the ECPA indicates that the Communications Act
alone governs satellite pay-television piracy. 99 Thus, the crux
of the confusion over what communications the ECPA protects
is that the broad, plain language appears to conflict with the
legislative history, ° ° suggesting a more restrictive definition of
"electronic communications."
A more thorough analysis compels the conclusion that the
ECPA protects both private and commercial satellite communi-
cations. The Herring court overstated the effect that the legis-
lative history should have on construing the statute. While the
legislative history of the ECPA certainly emphasizes privacy
protection, 10 it also discusses the statute's protection of com-
mercial satellite and cable broadcasts. 0 2 Moreover, the statute
98. See Herring, 933 F.2d at 935; see also Greek Radio Network of Am. v.
Vlasopoulos, 731 F. Supp. 1227, 1233 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (holding that ECPA does
not protect subscription radio transmissions, even though "not intended for
the use of the general public," because such transmissions do not include
"'private, business, or personal communications'" (quoting Cox Cable Cleve-
land Area, Inc. v. King, 582 F. Supp. 376, 382 (N.D. Ohio 1983))).
99. See Herring, 933 F.2d at 935, 937-38.
100. Many courts accord substantial weight to committee reports in con-
struing statutes. See, ag., Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 75 (1984);
Guaranty Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Ryan, 928 F.2d 994, 1004 (11th Cir. 1991); Mills v.
United States, 713 F.2d 1249, 1252 (7th Cir. 1983), cert denied, 464 U.S. 1069
(1984). But see Hirschey v. FERC, 777 F.2d 1, 7-8 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (arguing that committee reports should carry little weight because
Congress neither approves them nor relies on them for explanation of a stat-
ute's details).
101. The Senate and House committee reports suggest that the ECPA is
limited to private communications. The Herring court focused on one state-
ment in the Senate Report on the ECPA: "The private viewing of satellite
cable programming . . . will continue to be governed exclusively by [the
amended] Communications Act ... and not by [the ECPA]." S. REP. No. 541,
supra note 37, at 22, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C-.AN. at 3576 (emphasis added).
Moreover, throughout the same report, the Judiciary Committee emphasized
the need to protect "the security and privacy of business and personal commu-
nications." Id. at 2, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3556. The House Judici-
ary Committee expressed concern with new surveillance techniques
unregulated by statute. H.R. REP. No. 647, supra note 63, at 16-19, 28. Both
reports suggest that the Act was designed to preserve Fourth Amendment pri-
vacy rights. See id. at 16, 19; S. REP. No. 541, supra note 37, 1-2, 5, reprinted in
1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3555-56, 3559; see also 131 CONG. REc. S11800 (daily ed.
Sept. 19, 1985) (statement of Sen. Mathias) (asserting that "the goal of the leg-
islation is a familiar and enduring one: To protect the privacy of Americans
against unwanted and unwarranted intrusion.").
102. See S. REP. No. 541, supra note 37, at 6, 7, 21, reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3560, 3561, 3575; see also 132 CONG. REc. S14452 (daily ed. Oct.
1, 1986) (statement of Sen. Mathias) (explaining that "interceptions [of video
transmissions via satellite] are already covered by § 705 of the Communica-
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provides evidence of congressional intent to regulate satellite
cable communications beyond the general definition of "elec-
tronic communications. 1 0 3
For example, section 2511, which governs interception of
protected communications, permits private not-for-profit view-
ing of unencrytped satellite programming.1° 4 This exception
has two implications. First, it indicates section 2511 grants a
cause of action against those who intercept unscrambled broad-
casts for profit. Second, because Congress did not also exempt
scrambled broadcasts from the general definition of "electronic
communications," section 2511 by its terms prohibits inter-
cepting such communications. 0 5 In addition, Congress chose to
exempt all interception of cable television programming from
the provisions of section 2511, leaving exclusive governance of
cable piracy to the Communications Act.106 While it could have
provided similarly for satellite programming, Congress chose
instead to make the ECPA and section 705 of the Communica-
tions Act complementary, not mutually exclusive.10 7 Thus, the
various provisions of the ECPA, taken as a whole, suggest that
Congress contemplated the statute's protection of commercial
satellite communications.
The amendments Congress made to the Communications
Act contemporaneously with the passage of the ECPA do not
alter the conclusion that the latter protects satellite program-
tions Act. The provisions in [the ECPA] are in addition to any remedies that
may be available to the Government or to a private party under the Communi-
cations Act.") (emphasis added).
103. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
104. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(4)(c)(i) (1988).
105. Section 2511 prohibits interception of "any wire, oral, and electronic
communications." Id § 2511(1)(a). The broad definition of "electronic com-
munication" encompasses all satellite broadcasts on its face. See supra note 65.
Herring indicated that the legislative history compels a more narrow reading
which excludes commercial satellite cable programming. See supra notes 92-93
and accompanying text. The exemption for private viewing of unscrambled
programming, however, shows that Congress considered "electronic communi-
cations" to include all satellite broadcasts. Since it did not also exempt scram-
bled broadcasts from the broad definition, Congress intended that § 2511
prevent interception of such communications.
106. Section 2511(2)(g)(iii)(I) states that the ECPA does not govern con-
duct prohibited by § 633 of the Communications Act. Section 633 of the Com-
munications Act prohibits the unauthorized reception of cable service and the
sale and manufacture of pirated cable decoders. See Cable Communications
Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, § 633, 98 Stat. 2779, 2796-97 (1984) (codi-
fied at 47 U.S.C. § 553 (1988)); see also supra note 54 and accompanying text
(explaining the Communication Act's prohibition on cable piracy).
107. See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(g)(iii)(II) (1988).
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ming. 0 s In both 1984 and 1988, Congress amended section 705
of the Communications Act to address the issue of satellite tele-
vision piracy.10 9 While the McNutt court relegated discussion of
the Communications Act to a footnote,110 the Herring court
thoroughly analyzed section 705 and its relationship to the
ECPA, which Congress enacted in 1986.' The Herring court
reasoned that it was unlikely that Congress intended the ECPA
to duplicate coverage of satellite communications piracy already
contained in the Communications Act." 2 Such an analysis ig-
nores specific extrinsic evidence showing that Congress did not
consider the statutes mutually exclusive. The legislative his-
tory of the SHVA-the 1988 amendment to the Communica-
tions Act-states that both section 705 and section 2511 of the
ECPA protect commercial satellite broadcasts. 113
In addition, the statutory scheme governing communica-
tions is neither as neat nor as logical as the Herring court sug-
gested." 4  Congress enacted the principal statutes, the
Communications Act and Title III, when communications tech-
108. One commentator has argued that courts should not look to other
statutes in attempting to discern the meaning of one. See Easterbrook, supra
note 15, at 547 (asserting that it is "impossible to reason from one statute to
another").
109. See supra notes 49-54 and 69-73 and accompanying text.
110. United States v. McNutt, 908 F.2d 561, 564 n.2 (10th Cir. 1990), cerL
denied, 111 S. Ct. 955 (1991).
111. See United States v. Herring, 933 F.2d 932, 935-38 (11th Cir. 1991).
112. See id. at 938.
113. See H.R. REP. No. 887(H), supra note 5, at 14, reprinted in 1988
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5643 (asserting that "[§] 2511(1) [of the ECPA] ... prohibit[s]
the unauthorized interception and use of satellite[-delivered cable program-
ming]"). This is not a case where subsequent legislative history bears on the
intent of the earlier Congress. See, e.g., Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v.
GTE Sylvania, 447 U.S. 102, 117-18 (1980); Sierra Club v. Clark, 755 F.2d 608,
617 (8th Cir. 1985); Montana Wilderness Ass'n v. United States Forest Serv.,
655 F.2d 951, 957 (9th Cir. 1981), cert denied, 455 U.S. 989 (1982). Rather, the
statement that the ECPA prohibits unauthorized interception of satellite tele-
vision signals suggests that Congress was fully conscious of the overlap be-
tween the statutes in 1988, contrary to the Herring court's finding.
114. See Burnside, supra note 36, at 495-503 (explaining inconsistencies in
the protections of the ECPA); Helland, supra note 51, at 116-17 & n.9 (assert-
ing that neither amendments to § 705 nor the legislative history accompanying
them "explain in any significant detail the purpose or parameters of the provi-
sion" and noting the "absence of congressional direction" with regard to the
provision); Meyer, supra note 38, at 434-37 (arguing that ECPA's protection of
cellular phone communications without similar protection for cordless phone
communications is irrational because both "transmit unencrypted signals
which may be intercepted easily with readily available technologies"). As an
example of the wiretap law's seemingly random structure, consider the fact
that Congress did not provide a private cause of action against § 2512 violators
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nology did not approach today's sophistication.11 5 As technol-
ogy advanced, Congress amended each statute in response to
many concerns, including lost privacy, lost revenues, and law
enforcement needs.'1 6 The resulting statutes are hybrid prod-
ucts of differing eras. They contain a myriad of exceptions and
qualifications appended to the original statutory text. The stat-
utes overlap in some areas but retain exclusive governance in
others." 7 They use broad, sweeping language in some places
and narrow, specific language in others." 8 For these reasons,
any attempt to impose an artificial order on this patchwork of
rules is fraught with danger.
The ECPA and the Communications Act are overlapping
statutory schemes for combatting property rights violations and
privacy intrusions in communications. Congress has, perhaps
inadvertently, created an embryonic, flexible package of rules
capable of confronting communications issues in various ways.
Courts should recognize that, despite its title, the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act governs commercial, as well as
private, communications.
under either Title III or the ECPA, although it did provide such a right of ac-
tion against violators of § 2511.
One commentator asserts that courts cannot assume that legislatures act
reasonably because such bodies respond in seemingly unreasonable ways to
various pressures in the political process. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FED-
ERAL COURTS: CRIsIs AND REFORM 288-89 (1985).
115. Indeed, one commentator asserts that § 705(a), enacted in 1934, is a
provision "not created to promote any modern interests, not designed in recog-
nition of modern technology, and not equipped to resolve or reconcile modern
conflicts." Helland, supra note 51, at 129. Modern amendments to the Com-
munications Act have added subsections to § 705 which clarify the original
text's application to satellite cable communications. See supra notes 49-54 and
69-73 and accompanying text.
116. See supra notes 35-46 and accompanying text.
117. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(g)(iii) (1988) (providing that the Commu-
nications Act alone governs the unauthorized interception of cable television
and the sale of pirated cable decoders, despite the ECPA's regulation of "wire
communications," and that both § 705 of the Communications Act and the
ECPA allow private viewing of unscrambled satellite programming).
118. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1) (1988) (preventing interception of "wire,
oral, or electronic communication") and 47 U.S.C. § 705(a) (1988) (preventing
interception and use of radio communications) with 18 U.S.C. § 2511(4)(c)
(1988) (allowing interception of a "satellite transmission that is not encrypted
or scrambled and that is transmitted to a broadcasting station for purposes of
retransmission to the general public") and 47 U.S.C. § 705(b) (1988) (allowing
the "interception or receipt by any individual . . . of any satellite cable pro-
gramming for private viewing if the programming involved is not encrypted").
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B. THE STANDARD OF LIABILITY
Deciding that the ECPA protects satellite television com-
munications, however, is only the first step in analyzing the
statute's application to unauthorized descramblers. Section
2512 of the ECPA prohibits the manufacture or sale of any de-
vice the "design [of which] renders it primarily useful for the
purpose of the surreptitious interception of [protected commu-
nicationsl.""- 9 Courts are in conflict over the proper application
of this standard of liability.
The McNutt court's analysis relied predominantly on the
text of section 2512 in finding pirated descramblers to be pro-
hibited by the ECPA.120 While it described the design of such
descramblers in its background section, 2 1 the court isolated
two illicit features of the devices which it found brought them
within section 2512: that they intercept electronic communica-
tions and that they do so without the knowledge of program-
mers.122 The McNutt court's terse analysis leaves the scope of
section 2512 in doubt, offering no principles that limit liability
other than the requirement that the device secretly intercept
protected communications.m
While the rationale of the McNutt court's decision would
unduly broaden liability under section 2512, the Herring court's
opinion would render the provision obsolete, as emerging tech-
nology did to Title III.124  Based on United States v.
Schweihs, 2 5 the Herring court identified two factors important
to determining whether devices violate section 2512.126 The
first focuses on the physical appearance of devices in question,
asking whether their "design show[s] that they [have] few if
119. 18 U.S.C. § 2512(1)(b) (1988).
120. See United States v. McNutt, 908 F.2d 561, 565 (10th Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, 111 S. Ct. 955 (1991); see also United States v. Hux, 940 F.2d 314, 320
(8th Cir. 1991) (Ross, J., dissenting) (relying on plain language to find that
§ 2512 prohibits pirated descramblers).
121. McNutt, 908 F.2d at 562-63.
122. Id. at 565.
123. The court's finding that descramblers "intercept" electronic communi-
cations means that devices need only be "useful," and not "primarily useful,"
for the prohibited purpose to fall under § 2512. Such a standard would
criminalize the sale of all electronics equipment capable of intercepting pro-
tected communications, thus expanding liability to merchants of legitimate
devices.
124. See supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text.
125. 569 F.2d 965 (5th Cir. 1978).
126. United States v. Herring, 933 F.2d 932, 934 (11th Cir. 1991). The Her-
ring court considered the Schweihs analysis applicable to the ECPA. See
supra note 92 and accompanying text.
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any legal purposes." 2 Descramblers with cloned chips do not
fall under this test, the court indicated, because "their design is
identical to [devices] that are legitimate." 128 The Fifth Circuit
decided Schweihs prior to 1986, when the statute concerned de-
vices that intercept wire and oral communications. 129 Under
the ECPA, which Herring applied, however, Congress broad-
ened the scope of section 2512.130 The court's concern with the
physical similarity between authorized and unauthorized
descramblers ignores the expansion of section 2512 and the pos-
sibility of a concomitant expansion of the "design" inquiry.
The second, and related, test which the Herring court con-
sidered calls for an examination of the potential uses of the de-
vices. The statute prohibits devices that are "primarily useful"
for illicit interception, thus permitting devices with "significant
nonsurreptitious and legitimate uses."'131 While the enactment
of the ECPA did not alter this test, the court found that the ca-
pacity of pirated descramblers for intercepting "soft scrambled
signals,"'31 2 which require no payment or authorization to re-
ceive, gave the devices "significant legitimate uses." 13s This
reasoning is defective in light of the devices Congress originally
stated that section 2512 prohibits, devices such as microphones
disguised as cuff links.L3 4 While a hidden microphone has innu-
merable legitimate uses, it substitutes for a standard
127. Herring, 933 F.2d at 934; see also United States v. Shriver, 782 F. Supp.
408, 411 (C.D. Ill. 1992) (holding that the term "surreptitious" in § 2512 "refers
to the design of the interception device, not its use").
128. Herring, 933 F.2d at 934.
129. Under Title III, which limited the term "interception" to "aural acqui-
sition" of protected communications, the legislative history suggests that pro-
hibited devices must be designed to conceal their interception capabilities upon
visual inspection. See supra note 27. The legislative history indicates that
Congress was concerned mainly with devices that enabled others to record or
transmit conversations-to "aurally acquire" such exchanges--without detec-
tion. See S. REP. No. 1097, supra note 18, at 95, reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.CA.N.
at 2183-84 (stating that a prohibited device "would... have to possess attrib-
utes that give predominance to the surreptitious character of its use, such as
the spike in the case of the spike mike or the disguised shape in the case of the
martini olive transmitter"); see also United States v. Pritchard, 745 F.2d 1112,
1123 (7th Cir. 1984) (affirming conviction under § 2512(1)(b) of a defendant
who used a tape recorder disguised as a briefcase because the "apparatus was
designed in such a way as to conceal its electronic components and make its
principal use that of surreptitiously listening to oral communications").
130. See supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text.
131. Herring, 933 F.2d at 934.
132. See id.
133. United States v. Hux, 940 F.2d 314, 318 (8th Cir. 1991); Herring, 933
F.2d at 934.
134. See supra note 27 (quoting Senate Report's list of prohibited devices).
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microphone primarily to record conversation secretly.1' The
hidden microphone's many potential legitimate uses do not
take it outside of section 2512. Similarly, the primary reason
dish owners purchase pirated descramblers is to receive pre-
mium programming for no charge. That such descramblers also
happen to intercept soft scrambled signals is merely incidental
to the primary reason pirates sell thousands every year: the
unauthorized interception of satellite pay-television broadcasts.
Indeed, Congress used language strikingly similar to section
2512 when it enacted the SHVA, which explicitly prohibits un-
authorized descramblers.13 6 Such use of language indicates that
Congress considered pirated descramblers "primarily useful"
for accessing satellite cable broadcasts without permission. 3 7
The overly strict construction138 that the Herring court gave to
135. This conclusion, at least, is apparently what Congress presumed to be
the case with the devices listed in the Senate Report. See supra note 27. Each
of these devices could be used in the many legitimate ways that people use
standard microphones, but their deceptive design gives them special uses
which provide the incentive for their purchase. Standard microphones, of
course, may be used in illicit ways, but Congress did not consider such "legiti-
mate electronics equipment... primarily useful for surreptitious listening." S.
REP. No. 1097, supra note 18, at 95, reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2183.
136. In relevant part, the SHVA prohibits the sale and manufacture of de-
vices which are "primarily of assistance in the unauthorized decryption of sat-
ellite cable programming." 47 U.S.C. § 705(e)(4) (1988) (emphasis added).
137. Cf. United States v. Frakes, 563 F.2d 803, 805 (6th Cir. 1977) (using def-
inition of the term "stolen" from one statute to supply definition for another
statute), vacated, 435 U.S. 911 (1978). The House Report on the SHVA con-
firms that Congress intended to prohibit descramblers which have been "com-
promised by black market decoding chips." H.R. REP. No. 887(11), supra note
5, at 28-29, re/printed in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5657-58. If the court's reasoning
were applied to the SHVA, all unauthorized descramblers would be legal be-
cause, as the Herring court concluded, dish owners may use them primarily to
decrypt signals for which no authorization is required, i.e., "soft scrambled sig-
nals." Such an absurd result would in effect repeal the SHVA.
138. The Herring court relied on the "rule of lenity" in determining that
the ECPA called for a strict construction. See 933 F.2d at 937. This interpre-
tive canon, under which courts are to construe criminal statutes narrowly, ap-
plies most forcefully when the accused does not have adequate notice that her
conduct is prohibited. See Crandon v. United States, 110 S. Ct. 997, 1002-03
(1990); United States v. Powell, 423 U.S. 87, 93 (1975). Here, however, those
who sell unauthorized descramblers do have adequate notice that their con-
duct is illegal, based both on accepted community standards of behavior and
the clarity of § 705 of the Communications Act following enactment of the
SHVA. See John C. Jeffries, Jr., Legality, Vagueness, and the Construction of
Penal Statutes, 71 VA. L. REV. 189, 231 (1985) (arguing that "criminal liability
should be permitted... where a law-abiding person would have known bet-
ter"); cf WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AuSTIN W. ScOTT, JR., CRIMINAL LAW § 2.2(d),
at 78 (2d ed. 1986) (asserting that "strict construction should not be carried to
extremes; it is not necessary that the statute be given its 'narrowest meaning'
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the potential use test undermines section 2512.
The proper interpretation of section 2512 takes into ac-
count the evolving nature of communications technology. The
plain language of section 2512 is certainly applicable to
descramblers. 13 9 Yet, when statutes address complex techno-
logical issues, as here,140 courts should consult other sources to
inform the statutory text.141 Although Congress did not men-
tion satellite descramblers by name in the ECPA's legislative
history,142 Senator Mathias stated that the statute should "an-
ticipate further technological developments."'143 This purpose is
apparent from the amendments Congress made to Title HI in
1986. First, Congress expanded the term "intercept" to include
visual, as well as aural, acquisition of protected communica-
or a 'forced, narrow or overstrict construction' "). The rationale behind the
rule of lenity is not offended by finding liability here because the average citi-
zen would certainly be aware that selling descramblers containing pirated
chips violates the law.
139. The starting point for analyzing any statute, of course, is the statutory
text itself. The Supreme Court's traditional practice has been to follow a stat-
ute's plain language unless doing so produces an absurd or unjust result. See,
e.g., Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 570 (1982); United States
v. American Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. 534, 542-43 (1940); Haggar Co. v. Helver-
ing, 308 U.S. 389, 394 (1940). There is no specific test for determining when a
particular result is "absurd," but the Supreme Court requires something ex-
traordinary. Cf Griffin, 458 U.S. at 574-75 (finding that a damage award of
over $300,000 to compensate plaintiff for withheld wages of $412.50 was not an
absurd result).
140. Congress thoroughly assessed new communications technology in
crafting the ECPA. It held multiple hearings on communications privacy and
received information from dozens of experts and organizations throughout the
country. See H.R. REP. No. 647, supra note 63, at 28-30; S. REP. No. 541, supra
note 37, at 3-5, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3556-60. Moreover, Congress
encountered great difficulties in formulating the ECPA. See 131 CONG. REC.
S11,800 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 1985) (statement of Sen. Mathias) ("[Tihis legisla-
tive foray into uncharted territory requires us to confront difficult legal and
technical issues.").
141. Justice Frankfurter succinctly captured the essence of this sentiment:
"[T]he real meaning of seemingly plain words must be supplied by a considera-
tion of the statute as a whole as well as by an inquiry into relevant legislative
history." Interstate Commerce Comm'n v. J-T Transp. Co., 368 U.S. 81, 107
(1961) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); see also American Trucking Ass'ns, 310
U.S. at 544 (finding that "acceptance of a literal interpretation dogma... with-
holds from the courts available information for reaching a correct
conclusion").
142. Indeed, the only statement on § 2512 in the Senate Report to the
ECPA simply recites the pertinent portion of the text, omitting any further
clarification. See supra note 66.
143. See, e.g., 131 CONG. REC. S11,800 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 1985) (statement of
Sen. Mathias).
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tions. 44 Second, Congress broadened section 2512 to prohibit
devices that intercept electronic, as well as wire and oral, com-
munications.145 Devices that intercept electronic communica-
tions do not necessarily give unauthorized access through the
same design features as do eavesdropping and wiretapping de-
vices. Unauthorized descramblers, for instance, secretly inter-
cept communications through pirated chips, and not through a
deceptive appearance like microphones disguised as cuff links.
Thus, in order to fulfill the statute's purpose of evolving with
technology, courts must make a broader inquiry into a device's
design than did the Herring court."46
The purpose behind section 2512 of Title III was to prohibit
devices designed mainly for unauthorized access to protected
communications. 147 The qualifying term "primarily useful" en-
sures that legitimate electronics equipment, such as radio scan-
ners which can be used to intercept protected communications,
remain legal. While the Schweihs court asked whether a device
has "significant legitimate uses," Congress cautioned that "[a]
device will not escape the prohibition merely because it may
have innocent uses." 148 Construing this phrase thus requires a
common sense inquiry into the likely reason that the device
was produced and purchased.149 For the "primarily useful"
test, courts should ask whether the device would be produced
144. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
145. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
146. Cf. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 472 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) (asserting that construction of the Fourth Amendment must recog-
nize technological changes and "have a... capacity of adaptation to a changing
world"), overruled by Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967). The Herring
court essentially interpreted the statute as if Congress had never amended it.
The court's approach is problematic for several reasons. First, it undermines
the legislative process. Amending a statute is a long and difficult process.
Congress is thus inefficient in addressing unresolved questions raised by tech-
nological advances. Fein, supra note 21, at 49. There are great lapses of time
between the passage of a statute addressing technology and its amendment,
and even a small number of legislators can sabotage attempts to amend. I
By ignoring the expansion of Title I, the Herring court ignored the implica-
tions of this delicate process. Second, obsolete statutes afford the judiciary
substantial policymaking authority which is beyond their proper judicial role.
1d. at 48. The Herring court assumed such authority by unduly restricting the
ECPA.
147. The eavesdropping devices listed in the Senate Report to Title III are
all intended for transmitting the spoken words of others without the speaker's
knowledge or consent. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
148. S. REP. No. 1097, supra note 18, at 95, reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N.
at 2183.
149. See United States v. Hux, 940 F.2d 314, 320 (8th Cir. 1991) (Ross, J.,
dissenting).
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but for the prohibited purpose. Descramblers, like the dis-
guised microphones that Congress discussed under Title III, fall
within this definition. 50
Fighting descrambler piracy under the ECPA concededly is
a less attractive method than using the Communications Act.
The penalty provisions of the Communications Act call for
broader remedies than do those of the ECPA.151 Indeed, Con-
gress designed the SHVA-the most recent amendment to sec-
tion 705-specifically to address satellite pay television piracy,
but it did not narrowly tailor section 2512 to this purpose. The
language of section 2512, rather, has a wider application than
this explicit ban on descramblers. 152 The Herring court's inter-
pretation leaves gaps in section 2512 which Congress would
have to fill by again amending the statute when unforeseen in-
terception devices hit the black market in the future. Because
updating statutes takes time, these devices could jeopardize the
security of communications for years before Congress acts.
Although pirated descramblers look the same as legitimate
models, their illicit design features and obvious purpose place
them within the class of devices that Congress intended to pro-
hibit. This interpretation recognizes the fundamental changes
that the ECPA wrought in the scope of Title III and ensures
that the statute, unlike its predecessor, does not become obso-
lete in the face of advancing communications technology.
CONCLUSION
The Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, along
with 1984 and 1988 amendments to the Communications Act,
modernized statutory protection of communications. Federal
circuit courts are divided over whether the ECPA prohibits un-
authorized satellite descramblers. Interpreting the ECPA to
150. See id
151. Those who sell illicit devices face a maximum under § 2512 of five
years of imprisonment and a fine of $10,000. 18 U.S.C. § 2512(1) (1988). Sec-
tion 705 provides for imprisonment of up to five years and fines of $500,000 for
each device sold. 47 U.S.C. § 705(e)(4) (1988). Moreover, § 705 provides a civil
right of action against those who sell illicit devices. 47 U.S.C. § 705(e)(3)(A)
(1988). The ECPA, however, apparently provides such a right only against
those who actually intercept protected communications. See supra note 26
(explaining that Title III offered no private right of action against sellers of
illegal interception devices).
152. The second clause of § 705 also has a generalized scope, not being lim-
ited to pirated descramblers as is the first clause. See 47 U.S.C. § 705(e)(4)
(1988) (prohibiting devices "intended for any . . . activity prohibited by
[§ 705](a)").
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ban pirated descramblers and similar devices provides certainty
in the law by recognizing the independence of the ECPA and
the Communications Act. More importantly, this interpreta-
tion gives substance to the changes that Congress made to mod-
ernize the statute in 1986, ensuring that the statute can
confront uncertain developments in the future.

